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For 20 years leading up to the uprisings of 2010-2011, Egypt and Tunisia suffered the ill effects
of neoliberal economic reform, even as the international financial institutions and most
economists hailed them as beacons of progress in the Arab world. For the preceding ten years,
workers and civil society organizations led a burgeoning protest movement against the
liberalizing and privatizing trajectories of the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes. Then came the
uprisings, which brokered the possibility of not only new political beginnings but also alternative
economic programs that would put the needs of the struggling middle, working and poorer
classes first and at least constrain, if not abolish, the privileges of a deposed ruling class.
In Egypt, labor activists, journalists, NGO researchers and even a few government
officials and capitalists eagerly shared their ideas for what should come next.1 Their visions fell
into four broad categories, from left to right: citizen-led social democracy, democratic state-led
development, top-down state-led development and return to the status quo ante. The citizen-led
proposals were not based on any particular ideology, but were thoughtful and became
increasingly detailed even as the arena for frank public discussion shrank. These proposals could
form an integrated people’s program if there were a democratic elected government in Egypt
committed to carrying them out. In Tunisia, democracy is muddling through with leadership
inherited from the old regime, with many good ideas for economic change percolating upward,
as in Egypt, but no coherent vision for how to construct a progressive alternative. In both cases,
the default setting is the restoration of neoliberalism with an inclusive mask.
Progressive Voices2
Labor’s resistance to privatization and liberalization had been surging over a decade prior to the
Egyptian uprising of January 2011, coming in waves that rose to tsunami level just as the more
middle-class, but equally militant, political movement came to a head with the occupation of
Tahrir Square. But neither the military government that took over after Husni Mubarak’s
overthrow nor the government of elected President Muhammad Mursi was responsive to the
needs of labor or the “occupy” movement, and street and workplace action resurged in 2012 and
2013.
After a lull around the buildup of the Tamarrud movement and the military’s ouster of
Mursi, labor actions began to mount again. Amid 1,420 protests in the first three months of 2014,
involving at least 100,000 workers across many services and industries, Prime Minister Ibrahim
Mahlab’s government was at loggerheads with the labor movement. After another low ebb
during the presidential election, the protest wave crested again when the new government refused
to consider labor’s demands. There were 94 labor protests in October and 111 in November of
2014. In response, the minister of manpower, Nahid al-‘Ashri, backed by the prime minister,
accused independent trade unions of being “the largest problem in the labor market, as
they…hinder work, leading to the deterioration of the Egyptian economy.”
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The movement’s demands, some specific to particular sectors but many common to all,
had been put forth under previous governments, starting with Mubarak, but were never
satisfactorily or respectfully dealt with. Egypt’s lack of a functioning democracy, especially no
freely elected national assembly (the parliament was disbanded by court order in June 2012) and
the media clampdown in 2013-2014, meant that workers had no means of influencing public
policy except job actions.
First and foremost, workers in independent professional syndicates and labor unions
called for a new labor law, something vaguely promised in the constitution of January 2014. This
law should recognize the right to organize in unions chosen by the workers themselves (as
opposed to the state-dominated monopoly of a single trade union federation) and the right for
those unions to bargain collectively. It should also enforce respect for the right to strike and to
engage in other forms of peaceful protest in order to pressure employers to bargain. From August
2013, this right was being denied, and arrest and violent treatment of organizers, strikers and
protesters became commonplace. The campaign regarding the labor law was stonewalled into
2015, with the investment minister announcing that a new law’s consideration must be postponed
until a new parliament is convened, while elections had been put off again until an undetermined
future date.
Second, workers demanded improvements in their economic wellbeing. Everyone from
textile workers to postal carriers to doctors wished to see a legally binding and universally
enforced minimum monthly salary. They insisted that it truly be a base salary, designed to cover
the actual cost of living and keep up with price inflation. As of January 2014, Mahlab’s
government had simply implemented the preceding government’s proposal, a minimum gross
income of 1,200 pounds (about $200), including not only wages but also variable components
like incentives, all before deductions for tax, insurance and pension. This minimum gross income
was granted only to those employed directly by the government—less than 18 percent of the
labor force—and not to employees of public-sector enterprises that are managed separately or to
the private sector. In addition, workers sought universal coverage for health and other forms of
social insurance and for retirement pensions not tied to permanent employment in a single
enterprise.
Third, workers demanded investment from public and private employers and an active
role for themselves in modernizing their industries and services, raising production and
improving efficiency, and they argued for the reinstatement of thousands of laid-off employees.
Public transport workers pointed out that in a country where the streets are choked with private
vehicles, 2,000 allegedly obsolete buses, out of a total of 4,700, were taken out of service in 2005
but only 600 were replaced by 2013. The spinning and weaving factories in Mahalla al-Kubra
were operating at 40 percent of capacity, with one sixth the number of workers employed there a
decade ago, working with aging equipment and shortages of raw materials under what workers
view as corrupt and ineffective management. Public-sector doctors argued for government
spending on health care to be raised from 4.5 percent of the annual budget to the international
standard of 15 percent for middle-income countries. Workers wanted to see companies such as
Tanta Flax and Oil that had been privatized illegitimately be revitalized as public-sector
enterprises, as stipulated by court order, with their own participation on managing boards. In
March 2014, Tanta Flax workers reentered the factory and tried to restart production on their
own. One important motive was to restore the purchase of raw flax produced by farmers who
depended on the income. The authorities cut off electricity to the plant and sent in police to expel
the uppity trespassers.
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Meanwhile, economists working at NGOs, at independent unions and as journalists were
proposing a plethora of good ideas for how to rebuild the economy with active citizen
participation. These economists were supportive of not only civil and human rights, as defined
by the UN Development Program, but also labor rights, including the right to work and to belong
to freely chosen labor unions, as defined in international conventions, most of which Egypt had
signed onto under Mubarak.
One overarching proposal, coming out of exacting analyses by NGOs such as the
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), is for total transparency in both current and
developmental budgeting. The goal is to have all components of budget construction available
free of charge online, and composed in such a way that they can be understood by the public. In
a democratic polity, there would be parliamentary committees overseeing and discussing the
budget for their constituents’ benefit as well as unfettered media coverage of the debates. This
process requires a free press and a freely elected parliament in which all parts of society are
represented. Once a budget is approved, complete transparency would enable groups to monitor
and evaluate its execution and results. Although the IFIs claim to promote transparency and
accountability in governance and claim to consult with civil society, they still negotiate with
governments behind closed doors. In 2012, an NGO, the Egyptian Center for Economic and
Social Rights, had to sue the Mursi government to publish the proposed budget for the following
fiscal year, which it had worked out in secret with International Monetary Fund consultants, at a
time when popular resentment of both the IFIs and the government were rising.
Complementary proposals addressed how to finance the national budget to provide the
most socially beneficial outcomes. Most argued that it was not necessary to borrow abroad,
because the required revenue was available domestically—through progressive taxation and
subsidy reform. A genuinely progressive income tax, with the exemption level raised to 18,000
pounds (about $3,000) per year, plus taxes on capital gains, real estate, mergers and acquisitions,
and financial transactions could have provided enough revenue in 2011-2012, for example, to
surpass the much-discussed (but not yet realized) IMF loan of $4.8 billion. Other suggested
revenue sources included collection of tax arrears from wealthy capitalists, estimated at 63
billion pounds, and pursuit of tax evaders, which could recover an estimated 126 billion pounds.
In parallel, arguments were made for reducing or eliminating subsidies to privileged
businesses, including luxury tourist resorts and real estate developers, domestic and foreign firms
in the cement, fertilizer, iron and steel, ceramics and aluminum industries that sell their output to
the domestic market for prices higher than in international markets, and exporters that received
subsidies for illegitimate reasons, this last item valued at 3 billion pounds in 2011-2012. The
conversion of bakeries and brick kilns, transport vehicles and microbuses to natural gas engines
would have yielded savings of 75 billion pounds out of the 110.5 billion actually spent
subsidizing petroleum products and electricity in 2011-2012. In addition, Egypt could claim a
one-time compensatory payment of foregone taxes on depleted oil and gas reserves that had been
extracted and sold by international companies to the world market at significantly higher than the
$17 per barrel contract price that Egypt had been receiving. Renegotiation of export prices of
natural gas to Turkey, Spain, Jordan and elsewhere to match international market prices would
bring in an additional 15 billion pounds each year. These sweetheart deals were made by
Mubarak’s government to enrich cronies or entice foreign capital.
Other NGO proposals for Egypt arose out of critiques of World Bank and other IFI-led
projects, regarding the negative impact on the “built environment” and the environmental and
social damage inflicted on communities without adequate compensation.3 They also came in
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reaction to government plans for “urban development” that privileged a few large would-be
buyers over the current inhabitants, even if the latter have clear-cut legal title. The alternative
proposals are for environmentally sound affordable housing and public infrastructure that allow
communities to stay intact with better public services. An EIPR review of World Bank projects
in Egypt as of 2014 finds that the familiar neoliberal approach still prevails, with growth led by
the private sector in providing public services and creating new enterprises, and with
unemployment, poverty and the spread of the informal sector treated as a unfortunate negative
externalities to be dealt with in separate programs. EIPR argues instead for a rights-based
approach that puts the latter set of problems squarely in the center of economic policymaking. 4
As outside creditors imposed conditions for further austerity, popular resistance arose not
only against cutbacks but against the implied loss of economic integrity and the concomitant and
apparently permanent indebtedness. Activists in Egypt and Tunisia argued for the cancellation of
the “odious” portion of the debt incurred by the Mubarak and Ben Ali governments for the
purchase of unneeded military or “security” equipment or for the personal enrichment of the
regime and its cronies. The demand was reiterated loudly when the World Social Forum
convened in Tunisia in March 2013. Cancellation of “odious” debt would reduce the interest
costs that eat up a significant part of the annual budget in each country and contribute to fiscal
and current account deficits.
An alternative to outright debt forgiveness is to turn the debt into aid for development
projects. For example, a left-wing member of the Tunisian parliament led a delegation to the
European Union to argue for a Marshall Plan-type program with a focus on domestic
development, including agriculture. Proposals to target agriculture in Tunisia, and especially
farmers’ rights, food security and rural community needs, have come from critics of World Bank
programs there, where development loans were wasted, as well as from Tunisian labor and
NGOs.5
Other proposals tailored to Tunisia tackle the unruly problems of unemployment and
dramatically uneven regional development. One economist proposed an “employer of last resort”
program to be phased in over a six-year period, building on the country’s pre-existing “solidarity
network” of small-scale bank lending and the national Solidarity and Employment Funds (all
founded in the 1990s). With plenty of needs to be met, especially in rural areas, in fields as
diverse as alternative energy, low-cost housing, education and health care, over 400,000 people
could be employed by the end of six years, with a wage bill at that point of 2.74 percent of GDP,
or less than 10 percent of the national budget. The multiplier effects and demonstration effects
would thus contribute more to economic growth than the program would cost.6
A more comprehensive proposal for Tunisia is a version of the social market economy.
The proposal posits an analogy between Sweden in the 1930s and Tunisia today, when
unemployment, poverty and regional disparities were high and public services were poorly
developed, among other similarities in the international and natural environments. During that
period, Sweden managed to develop an admirable model with high national standards and an
enforceable and society-wide social contract, accompanied by decentralization of administrative
and fiscal responsibility to spread the benefits of growth in an inclusive and equitable manner.7
(Muhanzua and Castel 2014).
The labor movement is as active in Tunisia as in Egypt, and there have been many strikes
since the uprising that protested economic conditions and public policy. Organized labor has a
less confrontational relationship with the post-uprising government than in Egypt, however.
Independent trade unions are legal in Tunisia and newer ones, some affiliated with the Islamist
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party Ennahda, quarrel with the largest and most influential federation, the UGTT. The UGTT
played a critical role when it joined the uprising in January 2011. It then worked with the main
employers’ organization, UTICA, and a group of opposition parties, to conduct protracted, but
ultimately successful, negotiations to get the elected, but unpopular, Ennahda-led coalition
government to step down in favor of a more socially neutral transition government that could
oversee the writing of a new constitution and election law.
The new constitution was approved in January 2014, and presidential and parliamentary
elections were held later that year, providing a peaceful “transition” to a new government but no
new policies. While its political role is important, the UGTT is active in promoting its members’
interests and able to bargain with the government directly over the society-wide minimum wage,
which was raised in 2013. According to representatives of the Tunisian Association of
Economists and the economic adviser to the UGTT, however, Tunisia still lacks the vision and
political will for an overarching program that can incorporate social negotiations into rebuilding
the economy, leaving organized labor and the unorganized bulk of the working class and
informal sector in unresolved tension with employers and the government.
In Egypt, social conflict was more overt than in Tunisia and remained intractable in early
2015. Unlike Ennahda in Tunisia, the Islamist government elected in 2012 did not form a
governing coalition and was less subtle in asserting sole command over all aspects of society and
economy. As unpopular as in Tunisia, that elected government was forced from power by the
Egyptian military, which proceeded to appoint a government that was equally uncompromising
and increasingly brutal. Subsequently, civil society organizations, progressive economists and
organized labor were repressed and their proposals and demands for reform went unheard.
Whereas political stability and reduced uncertainty were secured through peaceful compromise
in Tunisia, they were imposed by a restoration of authoritarian rule in Egypt, but in both cases
without a program for inclusive and sustainable development.
Democratic State-Led Development
UN agencies have mounted critiques of neoliberalism as “growth without development” since
the early 1990s. Their view is that liberalization, privatization and austerity entail widespread
human costs without the promised trickle-down benefits. These agencies, working separately or
in tandem, have produced finely honed proposals for alternatives, close to the “social market”
model made famous by the Scandinavian countries, overlapping but not coterminous with the
bottom-up proposals of the labor movement, NGOs and economists described above.
These programs stress the need to balance private and public-sector economic activity.8
They would keep some neoliberal reforms, for example, staying open to foreign trade and
productive foreign direct investment. What they add is careful regulation and fair negotiation to
ensure benefits to the developing country, such as technology transfer, backward and forward
linkages into the domestic economy, contracted limits on the retraction of invested capital, and
labor and environmental protections. They argue that integration into the world economy would
be more equitable and provide more bargaining power if it were based on cooperation among
equal Middle Eastern and North African partners, not, as it is now, between wealthy patron states
from the Gulf and supplicants from the diversified but poorer neighbors, like Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco and Tunisia.
In restoring a balance between the public and private sectors, after two decades of a
shrinking, increasingly irresponsible state and growing crony capitalist domination of economic
policy, the UN agencies recommend industrial policy to diversify economies and develop new
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comparative advantages, to revive agriculture and to shift to green energy. The state is to resume
the provision of investment in infrastructure, including agriculture, and in education and health
care, but not to invest in direct production of non-public goods and services. The latter can be
provided by a competitive private sector (free of crony capitalists), under a clear, fair and
simplified regulatory system that encourages business formation in productive sectors that
generate employment and that is willing to invest in neglected regions of the country. Such
measures would help regional economies break out of the rentier-society trap that virtually all
have found themselves in.
A fundamental requirement is that the public sector be accountable and responsive to the
citizenry, with full transparency in budgeting and allocation of resources. A matching
requirement is that private business play by a new set of rules, in which they pay their fair share
of taxes and ensure decent working conditions. Another match is made between the citizenry and
private business paying into a fairly enforced system of progressive taxation on income, property
and capital gains, as opposed to regressive sales and value-added taxes, while social security
(such as pensions and unemployment compensation) and wage protection is extended to draw in
workers and entrepreneurs from the informal sector and to restructure the safety net for the poor
and unemployed. Furthermore, each country needs to ensure a society-wide minimum wage that
is a “living wage,” and to have labor laws that respect the rights of workers to organize
independent unions, to assemble freely and to strike.
This new set of rules would have to be negotiated through dialogue among social groups
to settle their differences, including representatives of labor and civil society. A critical
difference between the IFIs and the UN programs is that the former see unemployment as mainly
a supply-side problem, that is, the fault lies with workers who are unqualified for the jobs that
exist in the private sector, whereas the latter see it mainly as a demand-side problem, a
consequence of two decades of “investment” choices that favored energy-intensive industries or
industries that created low-quality jobs in export production, real estate and trade. While the IFIs
are promoting the “entrepreneurship” avenue of small and midsize enterprise as the vehicle for
job creation, the UN position is that such development is good, but that society cannot depend
solely on the pursuit of profit by firms, no matter how small, to solve its problems. Thus
government’s job in overseeing these reforms is to ensure that investment is “pro-poor,” by
deliberately focusing on rural, underserved regions with high unemployment and high poverty
rates and by using “active labor market programs” to stimulate labor-intensive activities.
Corporatist Industrial Policy
Careful research on how Tunisia became a “neoliberal” star revealed that its successes relied on
a foundation of state-led development in industry and investment in human development, layered
over not with a big jump to liberalization and privatization, but with gradual reform and limited
integration with the international economy controlled rather tightly from the top.9 This success
then undermined itself with the turn toward cronyism and the neglect of productive domestic
investment needed to generate decent employment, deficits that became increasingly obvious
during the boom and bust years of the 2000s leading up to the uprising.
Without wishing to constrain the development of capitalism, some Egyptian economists
have considered that the neoliberal era went too far in curbing the responsibility of the public
sector and put too much faith in a private sector that provided insufficient productive investment
to generate employment and slid too easily toward cronyism. The former acting director of the
Economic Research Forum, Samir Radwan, for example, concluded a review of Egypt’s
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Competitiveness Report in 2006 with recommendations for a comprehensive industrial strategy
to be implemented by the National Competitiveness Council, which would “bring together
Egypt’s private and public sector, along with civil society leaders to form a common vision and
unify action…. It would set priorities, provide advice to the government and monitor progress,
making recommendations based on the latest data, the best expertise and the insights among
Egyptian experts from many parts of society.” While this idea sounds more promising that pure
neoliberalism and overlaps in significant ways with the UN visions, it puts the onus of
policymaking on top-down leadership, not necessarily democratically chosen, and is not
sensitive to the needs of labor or voices from the bottom.
Another exemplar of this point of view is Ahmad Galal, who began in the 1990s to
consider whether Egypt might benefit from an East Asian-style industrial policy, perhaps like
that of South Korea. (These days the comparison is more likely to be made to Malaysia.) Galal
was a member of the group of economists and business leaders that formed a think tank in the
2000s, the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES), which sought to redress some of the
excesses of neoliberal reform in order to restore domestic investment, productivity growth and
employment. Galal served as executive director of the Economic Research Forum from 2007 to
2013, when he joined the Mahlab government as finance minister for about 18 months
During his time in public office, Galal pursued a practical Keynesian strategy of using
public investment in infrastructure to jump-start the economy and generate employment, with
mixed results. He was opposed to the fiscal restraints that the IFIs were pushing Egypt to adopt,
but tried to deal with the pressure to reduce universal subsidies for food and energy by
appointing a deputy to figure out how to make the program for conditional cash transfers more
effective and efficient, that is, to target subsidies to the poor who need them and who will, in
exchange, send their children to school and use preventive health services. Galal left government
after the cabinet shakeup under President al-Sisi in February 2014, and was replaced by a
veteran of the Mubarak regime who was engaged in negotiating directly with the IMF at that
time
Putting the best face on the Sisi regime’s economic program as of March 2015, one could
argue that it is a form of state-led development. Its elements include several grand development
projects, including a second Suez Canal, a new capital city built from scratch to the east of Cairo,
desert land reclamation for corporate agriculture, and 100,000 housing units, at least some to be
“affordable,” to be built by the UAE-government backed firm Arabtec Construction on land
“donated” by the army. The dominant element in these and other plans is the pursuit of foreign
direct investment, as illustrated by the much-hyped investment conference at Sharm al-Sheikh
over the weekend of March 13-15, 2015.10 The participants included high-level representatives
from 20 countries, at least 200 firms, and the World Bank and IMF, the last represented by
Christine Lagarde herself. The biggest and firmest deals that came out of the conference were
with foreign energy corporations. With the explicit, even glowing, approval of the IFIs and
Western powers, there are many more promises for deals to come. The prominence of Gulfbased private capital in these arrangements, and Egypt’s continued dependence on financial aid
and loans from the governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are
accepted as necessary and beneficial props.
Some of the less glowing aspects of this “program” have been the subject of a number of
studies by NGOs and controversy in the Egyptian press, despite the regime’s efforts to control
the media.11 For example, British Gas is to resume investment in exploration and extraction of
natural gas from the Western Desert and Mediterranean offshore fields. While Egypt has
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undergone an energy crisis for several years with shortages of natural gas, British Gas intends to
liquefy much of its output and resume exports on ships leaving from its offshore terminal near
Alexandria. At the same time, Egypt will import gas from Israel, through the very same pipeline
it used to export gas to Israel in a contentious arrangement in the 2000s. Due to the same natural
gas shortage, and over the vociferous objections of the health, tourism and environment ministers
as well as environmental activists and the doctors’ syndicate, the government agreed in the
spring of 2014 to allow energy-intensive industries like the producers of cement (mostly owned
by foreign capital) to import and burn coal as their major fuel stock. The latter is just one
example of the exoneration and welcome-home of the Mubarak cronies known as the whales of
the Nile. Additional blessings for both domestic and foreign capital come from the generous
incentives in a new investment law and reductions in tax rates on profits that were announced
just before the conference. Another gift was the declaration of a law in mid-2014 prohibiting
third-party legal challenges to deals negotiated by the government with private investors or
contractors.
A March 22 ECES statement on the investment conference suggested that it could
optimize the beneficial effects if eight criteria were met. Four of these are strictly economic and
conform to IFI recommendations. They are continued fiscal consolidation, promoting small-firm
participation in the mega-projects and nurturing an Egyptian middle class, streamlining
government regulation of business and combating corruption, and reforming financial market
regulation to promote savings and private investment. Four other stipulations address issues of
social justice in a modest way. They include using public infrastructure investment and
incentives in the new investment law to spread private investment to the impoverished and
neglected hinterlands, vocational training for labor to hone skills needed by private employers,
availing youth of opportunities for social mobility with improved education and health services,
and “reforming the labor market laws to boost the creation of decent jobs and enhancing social
dialogue to improve working conditions and productivity.”
The Empire Strikes Back
Leading representatives of the World Bank, IMF and other IFIs, the G-8 “developed” economies,
the wealthy Gulf nations and other “donor” development agencies held a war council at
Deauville, France, in May 2011, in response to their blindsiding by the Arab uprisings. It is
apparent from a reading of the Interim Strategy Notes of the World Bank Group from May 2012
that the Deauville partners were desperate to get ahead of the “transition curve” in what they
labeled the “Arab countries in transition,” and that they were frightened by the hostility and
mistrust of Tunisian and Egyptian respondents, especially representatives of labor and civil
society.
Over the next two years, the World Bank and IMF proceeded to generate reams of
research papers “explaining” why the uprisings happened. They were shocked—shocked—to
discover that corruption, nepotism and cronyism had come to prevail in countries that they had
praised to the skies as recently as 2010 for their neoliberal reform efforts, and bemoaned the
endemic problems of poverty, unemployment and burgeoning informal sectors that these
culturally petrified Arab regimes had neglected to address. This “research” output appears to be a
massive campaign to outflank critics of neoliberalism and the earnest protesters themselves by
taking command of the production of knowledge about the “causes” of the uprising and thereby
winning legitimacy to take command of the programmatic solutions.
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The Deauville allies’ overarching aim is to salvage the fruits of neoliberalism and to use
their financial resources to garner the cooperation of the post-uprising governments of Tunisia
and Egypt (Islamist, non-Islamist, elected, non-elected, no matter) and to restore the dominance
of capital, whether domestic or foreign. Fiscal austerity and reducing budget deficits—that is,
shrinking the role and scope of the state—are still at the top of the agenda, followed closely by
liberalization—the streamlining of bureaucratic procedures and regulations to encourage
investment—and privatization, now taking the form of governments contracting out projects to
private companies and creating public-private partnerships to provide public services. Small and
midsize firms are to be provided with credit access and technical advice, as they are the agents
that will restore growth, create jobs and mature into the whales of the future. In parallel,
education is to be reformed to train workers with skills to match private employers’ needs, while
labor markets are to be made more “flexible” to increase employment. That is, once workers in
public-sector jobs face lowered wages and lose their job security and pensions, they and other
workers will be forced to compete for jobs in the presumably expanding private sector. Reducing
the budget deficit and rationalizing government spending requires the eventual elimination of
general subsidies for energy and food, and the substitution of welfare programs targeted only to
the truly needy, who are to be issued smartcards for food and fuel at below-market prices, along
with job training and conditional cash transfers.
The tone of the brightly illustrated IFI reports for public consumption is sympathetic and
kind, while the tone of the black, white and appropriately gray internal documents (which can be
found online with some assiduous searching) is arrogant and condescending, but the essential
message is the same. The Deauville pact members are going to conquer the “important structural
challenges” and “long-running structural deficiencies” in “Arab countries in transition” and
guide the new governments on the path to “modern” economies, following Western models of
higher education and relying on Western technology.12 The arsenal of weapons includes
technical advice, for example on how to set up a VAT system and how to target subsidies to the
deserving, along with outright bribes from the Gulf states and loans from everyone else. The
loans go to diverse local projects that the lenders, often the International Finance Corporation,
administer and monitor to assure that the desired results are forthcoming. The recurring hand
wringing about debt notwithstanding, these procedures will keep Egypt and Tunisia perpetually
in hock, as has been the case since the 1980s. The poor will always be with us, but we will give
them both fish to eat and poles to fish with, while the rights of labor go ever unattended and the
regimes of 2015 make satisfactory, ifhalting, “transitions” to democracy and free enterprise.
1

The ideas were shared at meetings with the author in Egypt in June 2012, June 2013, and May 2014, and in Tunisia
in March 2015. A list of these meetings is available upon request.
2

The current events described below were reported by the following online news media from January 2011 to
March 2015: www.english.ahram.org.eg, www.dailynewsegypt.com, wwwegyptindependent.com,
www.madamasr.com, http://tahriricn.wordpress.com, www.tunisialive.net, and www.thetunistimes.com
3

Bank Information Center 2013. “Impact of World Bank Policy and Programs on the Built Environment in Egypt.”
Washington DC: Bank Information Center (lead investigator Yahya Shawkat, Egyptian Initiative for Personal
Rights, Economic and Social Justice Unit, Cairo)
4

Reem Abdel Haliem, “Revisiting the Growth-Poverty Nexus in Egypt with Reference to the World Bank Country
Partnership Strategies” (Cairo: Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 2014).

10

5

Gana, Alia 2012. “The Rural and Agricultural Roots of the Tunisian Revolution: When Food Security Matters,”
International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 19 (2): 201-213.
6

Kaboub, Fadhel 2006. A Roadmap to Full Employment and Price Stability for Developing Countries: The Case of
Tunisia. University of Missouri, Kansas City: Ph.D. Dissertation
7

Muhanzua, Nice & Vincent Castel 2014. “Guided by the North Stars: No. 1 – The Swedish Model of Regional
Development as a Source of Inspiration for Tunisia.” African Development Bank Economic Brief
8

Examples of this work are: International Labor Organization 2012, Rethinking Economic Growth: Towards
Productive and Inclusive Arab Societies, Geneva: International Labor Organization; United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) 2011, Arab Development Challenges Report 2011: Towards the Developmental State in the Arab
Region, Cairo: Regional Center for Arab States; and Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)
2014, Arab Middle Class: Measurement and Role in Driving Change, Beirut: United Nations.
9

Cammett, Melani 2007. “Business-Government Relations and Industrial Change: The Politics of Upgrading in
Morocco and Tunisia,” World Development 35 (11): 1889-1903; Harrigan, Jane R. & Hamed El-Said 2010. “The
Economic Impact of IMF and World Bank Programs in the Middle East and North Africa: A Case Study of Jordan,
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, 1983 – 2004,” Review of Middle East Economics and Finance 6 (2): 1-25
10

A similar but smaller scale investment conference had been held at Gammarth, Tunisia, on March 5, organized by
the American Chamber of Commerce in Tunisia, the US State Department, and the Aspen Institute.
11

Sherif, Norhan, Heba Khalil and Harem Zayed 2015, Above the State: Multinational Corporations in Egypt,
Cairo: Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR)
12

Chauffour, Jean-Pierre 2013. From Political to Economic Awakening in the Arab World: the Path of Economic
Integration, Washington DC: World Bank: MENA Development Report: A Trade and Foreign Direct Investment
Report for the Deauville Partnership

